- Physicists and other scientists, who use the word "God" in a metaphorical sense, are frequently misappropriated by religious people who want to co-opt their statements to bolster their belief in God.
- Religion has an inappropriate dominance in the world and is afforded a level of respect and advantage that it doesn’t deserve and is privileged in ways that other worldviews are not.
Although Jesus probably existed, reputable biblical scholars do not in general regard the New Testament (and obviously not the Old Testament) as a reliable record of what actually happened in history...’ (p. 97)Notice how Dawkins implies that the those who disagree with this position are not reputable? This is complete nonsense. There are also reputable scholars (eg, N T Wright) who most certainly do believe that the gospels describe actual historical events. Dawkins makes the ridiculous statement that ’[t]he only difference between The Da Vinci Code and the gospels is that the gospels are ancient fiction while The Da Vinci Code is modern fiction.’ (p. 97) One wonders whether he has actually read either of them. One could go on interminably showing how Dawkins’ discussion of the arguments for God’s existence avoid interacting with the best Christian scholarship - apologetic and philosophical. But I suppose that, if Dawkins views theologians with such disdain, why would he wish to listen to dialogue with them? The next chapter entitled Why There Almost Certainly Is No God is a slight (but only slight) improvement. When Dawkins moves into his discussion of evolution then he becomes most articulate - clearly he is an expert in this area. But there are problems here as well. He persistently lumps Intelligent Design (ID) theorists in with creationists when ID theorists, themselves, make it very clear they do not wish to be seen that way. But the fallacy of guilt by association ploy works well for Dawkins. If he combines them then he doesn’t have to deal with ID theorists on their own terms and the reader is led to believe that there is no real difference between the two positions. In addition, Dawkins incorrectly describes ID theory as nothing more than the old ’God of the gaps’ theology so popular in previous years. Dawkins is just plain wrong about this as any reading of ID theorist literature would show. ID theorists make it very clear how ID theory is quite different to gap theology. Also, Dawkins’ critique of irreducible complexity demonstrates that he doesn’t understand what ID theorists are actually saying. In fact, Dawkins caricatures irreducible complexity as a position where, whenever we can’t understand how something has happened or happens, it gets labeled as irreducibly complex. This is completely inaccurate. A quick browse of Dawkins’ bibliography at the back of the book, which lists books he has cited or recommends, shows he hasn’t referred to one of the major scholars in the ID movement and who has done significant work on design inference, William Dembski. Either Dawkins has read Dembski’s work and has ignored it, or he hasn’t read it and, therefore, does not understand how ID scholars define the concept of design and how it might be identified scientifically. This is a major oversight by Dawkins who is clearly more interested in mere rhetoric to support his position than careful reasoning and argument which actually dialogues with his opposition. In fact, Dawkins spends more time quoting people who agree with him than actually engaging with the work of those who don’t. When Dawkins turns to the anthropic principle - the fact that the universe seems built for human existence - he makes a profound claim. We know that our universe supports life because we are here to talk about it. Wow! His major criticism of the inference to a Creator from the evidence that the universe appears built for human life is that we are left with the problem of Where did the Creator come from? Dawkins seems to forget that all theories of origins are left with where the first materials for the universe come from. Even cosmological theories have to either postulate something existing eternally or everything coming from nothing. Another arm of Dawkins’ argument is that, if the assertion of a Creator is true, then the Creator would need to be more complex that anything that exists. And yet, traditional theology argues that God is simple. How could something so complex as the universe be created by a simple God. Dawkins sees a contradiction here. But Dawkins doesn’t actually understand the concept of simplicity in relation to God. As Erickson (1986) defines it, simplicity refers to the unity of God as a being. God ’is not a composite and cannot be divided.’ (p. 152) An additional problem with Dawkins’ argument, though, is that the so-called simplicity of God is only one model of God proposed by Christian theologians. Dawkins doesn’t discuss the complexity of the debate of the nature of God but seems to choose the particular theological positions that suit his need to shoot down his opposition. Dawkins does an excellent job of describing the anthropic principle, but his critique leaves much to be desired. In Chapter 5, Dawkins turns his attention to "The Roots of Religion". If there is no Creator, and natural selection is the best explanation for the origin and development of all things, then Dawkins needs to provide an evolutionary explanation for religion. The striking thing about his discussion is the number of times terms like presumably occur. Evolutionary explanations for the occurrence of religion across cultures are pure conjecture. Dawkins begins this chapter with the statement that ’[e]verybody has their own pet theory of where religion comes from and why all human cultures have it.’ (p. 163) Indeed they do, including Dawkins. For Dawkins, the a priori assumption is natural selection. This is the absolute given for Dawkins. And given this assumption, Dawkins must find a suitable explanation that is driven by natural selection. So Dawkins explores a number of possible theories. Is it the need for consolation? Does it protect people from stress (the evidence is mixed on this)? Is it a placebo that prolongs life? These immediate (proximate) cause possibilities don’t really interest Dawkins. Appropriately, he is interested in ultimate causes. Might religion be the result of group selection? Group selection is the ’idea that Darwinian selection chooses among species or other groups of individuals’ rather than natural selection of individuals. Dawkins finds this theory wanting. Dawkins’ own view hypothesises that religion is ’a by-product of something else.’ (p. 172) Maybe
[t]he religious behaviour [is a] misfiring, an unfortunate by-product of an underlying psychological propensity which in other circumstances is, or once was, useful. On this view, the propensity that was naturally selected in our ancestors was not religion per se; it had some other benefit, and it only incidentally manifests itself as religious behaviour. (p. 174)What is that benefit? Dawkins suggests that it might be the result of adult authority figures passing on stories to children that originally had the intent of protecting them. It is worth quoting this central paragraph from Dawkins:
Natural selection builds child brains with a tendency to believe whatever their parents and tribal elders tell them. Such trusting obedience is valuable for survival ... But the flip side of trusting obedience is slavish gullibility. The inevitable by-product is vulnerability to infection by mind viruses. For excellent reasons related to Darwinian survival, child brains need to trust parents, and elders whom parents tell them to trust. An automatic consequence is that the truster has no way of distinguishing good advice from bad. The child cannot know that ’Don’t paddle in the crocodile-infested Limpopo’ is good advice but ’You must sacrifice a goat at the time of the full moon, otherwise rains will fail’ is at best a waste of time and goats. Both admonitions sound equally trustworthy. Both come from a respected source and are delivered with a solemn earnestness that commands respect and demands obedience. The same goes for propositions about the world, about the cosmos, about morality and about human nature. And, very likely, when the child grows up and has children of her own, she will naturally pass the whole lot on to her own children - nonsense as well as sense - using the same infectious gravitas of manner. (p. 176)Of course, this is all highly creative conjecture. Dawkins, however, makes the point that he is not so much interested in this as an accurate portrayal of what the real reason for religion is. This is merely an ’... example of the kind of thing ...’ that might be at the heart of the fact of religious experience. Dawkins appeals to the ’developing field of evolutionary psychology’ (p. 179) in support of his case. In essence, this view asserts that,
... just as the eye is an evolved organ for seeing, and the wing an evolved organ for flying, so the brain is a collection of organs (or ’modules’) for dealing with a set of specialist data-processing needs. There is a module for dealing with kinship, a module for dealing with reciprocal exchanges, a module for dealing with empathy, and so on. Religion can be seen as a by-product of the misfiring of several of these modules, for example the modules for forming theories of other minds, for forming coalitions, and for discriminating in favour of in-group members against strangers. (p. 179)This is the heart of Dawkins’ view. He writes that ’[t]he general theory of religion as an accidental by-product - a misfiring of something useful - is the one I wish to advocate.’ He goes on to say that ’[t]he details [of this theory] are various, complicated and disputable.’ (p. 188, emphasis supplied) Indeed they are. Following all of this conjecture, Dawkins turns to his own controversial theory of memes for an "explanation" of the details of a possible selection theory of religion. I will not go into detail regarding meme theory here. I don’t know enough about it. Instead, I will refer the reader to Alister McGrath’s excellent book, Dawkins’ God which includes a telling critique of Dawkins’ meme theory. McGrath points out a number of critical problems with the idea of memes:
- ’Darwinism itself seem[s] very poorly adapted to account for the development of culture, or the overall shape of intellectual history.’ (McGrath 2005, p. 126) In particular, ’... the model [of memes] is singularly uncompelling, perhaps because it is singularly inappropriate. Biological and cultural evolution have their points of similarity; they seem, however, to proceed by quite different mechanisms.’ (p. 128)
- ’... the meme idea is ... inadequately grounded in the evidence... Dawkins talking about memes is like believers talking about God - an invisible, unverifiable postulate, which helps explain some things about experience, but ultimately lies beyond empirical investigation.’ (p. 129)
- A ’flawed analogy between gene and meme’ (p. 130ff.)
It is all too easy to confuse fundamentalism with passion. I may well appear passionate when I defend evolution against a fundamentalist creationist, but this is not because of a rival fundamentalism of my own. It is because the evidence for evolution is overwhelmingly strong and I am passionately distressed that my opponent can’t see it - or, more usually, refuses to look at it because it contradicts his holy book. My passion is increased when I think about how much the poor fundamentalists, and those whom they influence, are missing. The truths of evolution, along with many other scientific truths, are so engrossingly fascinating and beautiful; how truly tragic to die having missed out on all that! Of course that makes me passionate. How could it not? But my belief in evolution is not fundamentalism, and it is not faith, because I know what it would take to change my mind, and I would gladly do so if the necessary evidence were forthcoming. (p. 283)Ah! So the difference between a religious fundamentalist and Dawkins’ passion is that he knows he is right! The evidence proves him right! And how sad it is that those poor deluded fundamentalist souls should die without knowing the truth. The paucity of Dawkins’ pleading here can be seen by reversing the protaganists in the quote. Imagine an Intelligent Design theorist (who Dawkins incorrectly lumps in with ’fundamentalist creationists’) saying this same paragraph to Dawkins:
It is all too easy to confuse fundamentalism with passion. I may well appear passionate when I defend intelligent design against a fundamentalist evolutionist, but this is not because of a rival fundamentalism of my own. It is because the evidence for intelligent design is overwhelmingly strong and I am passionately distressed that my opponent can’t see it - or, more usually, refuses to look at it because it contradicts his a priori assumptions. My passion is increased when I think about how much the poor fundamentalist evolutionists, and those whom they influence, are missing. The truths of intelligent design, along with many other theological truths, are so engrossingly fascinating and beautiful; how truly tragic to die having missed out on all that! Of course that makes me passionate. How could it not? But my belief in intelligent design is not fundamentalism, and it is not faith, because I know what it would take to change my mind, and I would gladly do so if the necessary evidence were forthcoming.If you can’t imagine an intelligent design theorist saying this, then may I suggest that you need to read more intelligent design literature. Dawkins can rationalise his fundamentalism away all he likes. But, his protestations to the contrary, his language and behaviour are hardly distinguishable from the fundamentalists he is so worried about. Now, it so happens that I actually agree with Dawkins on much that he says in criticism of fundamentalist thinking. It is often dangerous, arrogant, abusive, manipulative, ignorant, and all the other things that Dawkins calls it. The problem is that Dawkins, in his whole argument against ’the God delusion’ is breaking one of the most fundamental rules of critical thinking - the Principle of Charity. This principle states:
If a participant’s argument is reformulated by an opponent, it should be expressed in the strongest possible version that is consistent with the original intention of the arguer. If there is any question about that intention or about implicit parts of the argument, the arguer should be given the benefit of any doubt in the reformulation. (Damer 2005, p. 5-6)
Dawkins, in order to argue that religion is a delusion, has taken the very worst forms of religion (especially Christianity) and demolished it. He generalises his attack on religious fundamentalism to all forms of religion rather than dealing with the best forms of religion and restricting his criticism to specific destructive forms (ie, religious fundamentalism). But the error of lumping everything together is part of Dawkins’ strategy, because he not only wants to argue that fundamentalism results in all sorts of evil, but that even ’moderation in faith fosters fanaticism’ (p. 301). For Dawkins, suicide bombers
do what they do because they really believe what they were taught in their religious schools ... not necessarily by extremist fanatics but by decent, gentle, mainstream religious instructors, who lined them up in their madrasas, sitting in rows, rhythmically nodding their innocent little heads up and down like demented parrots. Faith can be very very dangerous, and deliberately to implant it into the vulnerable mind of an innocent child is a grievous wrong. (Dawkins 2006, p. 308)Yes, faith can be very very dangerous. But not all faith is. In Chapter 9, Dawkins turns to the issues of Childhood, Abuse and Religion. This chapter is a compelling read and anyone with any sensitivity to the plight of children would have to agree with its essential point - a lot of childhood abuse (not necessarily physical, but intellectual as well) goes on in the name of religion. Without diminishing, in any way whatsoever, the dark side of religious "education", it must be pointed out that Dawkins once again fails to present evidence showing that it is possible to believe in God without raising your children to be un-thinking fundamentalists. His picture of religious faith and experience is extremely one-sided. I know of Christians, for example, who raise their children with a broad view of the world, survey various intellectual options with them, ask them to think critically about everything they are taught, and have a richly nuanced view of the relationship between faith and reason. As an argument against childhood ’brainwashing’ and intellectual abuse, Dawkins’ discussion is very helpful. As an argument against all forms of faith and religion, it is sadly lacking. In the final chapter, Dawkins asks whether or not humans need God as a psychological/emotional gap-filler for inspiration or consolation. Obviously, his answer is ’No’. Science is all that is needed because it provides all the inspiration and consolation needed by humans. This, of course, is highly debatable. As Dawkins so rightly points out, some atheists are despondent and some happy and there are some Christians who are despondent and some happy. So the argument from emotional need is pointless. I at least agree with Dawkins here. If we cannot be consoled with reality/truth then it is not worth being consoled at all. So, what do we make of The God Delusion? Dawkins has written a passionate, biased, subjective, account of his views in which he occasionally makes some good points. He is highly unlikely to change anyone’s mind with it. In the preface of the book, Dawkins writes:
If this book works as I intend, religious readers who open it will be atheists when they put it down. What presumptuous optimism! Of course, dyed-in-the-wool faith-heads are immune to argument, their resistance built up over years of childhood indoctrination using methods that took centuries to mature (whether by evolution or design). Among the more effective immunological devices is a dire warning to avoid even opening a book like this, which is surely a work of Satan. But I believe there are plenty of open-minded people out there: people whose childhood indoctrination was not too insidious, or for other reasons didn’t ’take’, or whose native intelligence is strong enough to overcome it. Such free spirits should need only a little encouragement to break free of the vice of religion altogether. At very least, I hope that nobody who reads this book will be able to say, ’I didn’t know I could.’Dawkins is very rhetorically clever here. At the beginning of his books he divides the whole world up into two groups:
- died-in-the-wool faith-heads open-minded people